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ABSTRACT 
This paper utilizes longitudinal union variables to examines the gender differences in the wage change from enterins 
and leaving the union sector, as well as gender differences from remaining with a union employer and advancing 
up the seniority ladder. The union effects are estimated over a time trend from the late 19608 to the early 19808. 
The empirical results show that the female union joiner effect declines over time while the magnitude of the male 
union effect remains fairly stable over time. In general, the results show that unions' ability to impact wages for 
all white workers and black female union joiner has attenuated over time while union effects for all other black 
workers have remained relatively constant. 
DIFFERENCES IN LONGITUDINAL UNION RELATIVE 

WAGE EFFECTS ACROSS GENDER AND RACE 

INTRODUCTION 

Due to a persistent gender gap of 30% to 40%, women face a lower wage structure and have an incentive 
to seek union sector employment which typically pays higher wages. To the degree that the gender wage gap results 
from labor matk:et discrimination, unions may help ameliorate women's pay differential since coUective bargaining 
agreements have formal rules for pay, on-the-job training, and promotion. Researchers, over the years, have 
attempted to ascertain whether coUective bargaining benefits female workers more than male workers. That is, is 
the union wage gain larger for females or males, relative to their nonunion counterparts? Lewis [21] reviews many 
of the studies on gender variations in the union wage differential and finds that the union differential is the same, 
on average, for males and females. Black males, on the other hand, generally receive a larger union differential 
than white males. Consequendy, unions have been criticized as a hinderance to the improvement of the female wage 
distribution. Much of the criticism has been directed at seniority ladders. Since union jobs, particularly in high 
wage industries, are dominated by males, the seniority ladders prevent women from advancing into high wage 
occupations, and cause them to incur proportionally greater lay-offs during economic downturns. However, as 
seniority increases, women's advancement through occupational job ladders should enhance their wage distribution. 
Freeman and Leonard [13] find larger female differentials in the public sector and in some industries dominated by 
females. Figart [10] claims that unions have increased women's wages more than men's over the 19808, especially 
in the 35 to 54 age bracket. 
Traditionally. union status is measured by a single period dichotomous union variable. The parameter 
estimate for the union dummy variable is interpreted as the average relative wage differential from coUective 
bargaining, and it does not differentiate between workers who have recently entered the union sector and workers 
who have remained in the union sector to advance up the seniority ladders. The interpretation of the cross-sectional 
union wage gap as resulting solely from coUective bargaining has been criticized by numerous authors (e.g., Duncan 
and Leigh [9], and Lee [18]). Unmeasured or unobservable differences in labor quality may cause some or all of 
the wage gap since union employers would have an incentive to offset increased labor costs by hiring the most 
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productive workers from the labor pool. Therefore, it is likely that the union wage gap is positively correlated with 
unobserved productivity differences. The pioneering studies by Mellow [22] and Mincer [23] overcome the 
problems associated with unobserved quality characteristics by estimating the worker-specific wage change from 
entering (or leaving) the union sector over a longitudinal period. The longitudinal union effect will not be biased 
by unobservable productivity characteristics since it is based on an individual's wage in both the union and nonunion 
sectors. The longitudinal model developed by Mincer adds mobility among employers to the variables measuring 
change in union status. Mincer's model provides a more accurate assessment of variation in the union effects by 
gender, since it isolates workers searching for new jobs from those who remain with their initial employer. 
This study utilizes the Mincer longitudinal union status variables to investigate the gender differences of 
entering and leaving the union sector, as well as the gender differences in the wage change from remaining with 
a union employer and advancing up the seniority ladder. Previous studies rely on the traditional union variable to 
estimate union effects and report results for only one or two time periods. It is conceivable that the union 
differential changes over time. This study reports a time trend over 1970s and early 1980s to illustrate the gender 
variation in union effects. The data set, the Mincer wage level and wage change models, and the decomposition 
of the wage change into the "true" union entry effect are discussed in the second section. The third section 
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discusses the empirical results and compares the time trend of white and black female union effects with white and 
black males, and the study is concluded in the fourth section. 
DATA AND MEmOOOLOGY 
The data source is the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of young women and young men. The NLS 
young women and men data sets were selected because younger workers are more mobile between jobs and 
therefore have a higher probability of changing their union status. The data sets contain cohorts who were between 
the ages of 14 and 24 during the initial survey period of 1968 for young women and 1966 for young men.1 Since 
the collective bargaining status is not reported in all of the years, this study utilizes the 1969, 1970, 1971, 1976, 
1978, and 1980-81 young men's surveys; and the 1970-73, 1977-78, 1980, and 1982 young women's surveys. The 
young women's data are separated into seven longitudinal periods: 1970-71,1971-72,1972-73,1973-77,1977-78, 
1978-80, and 1980-82. The young men's data are separated into six longitudinal periods: 1969-70, 1970-71, 1971­
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76, 1976-78, 1978-80, and 1980-81. Separate wage equations are estimated for white females, black females, white 
males, and black males for each respective longitudinal period.2 The longitudinal periods represented by this data 
span a variety of macroeconomic conditions and permit the estimation ofwage differentials and wage change effects 
over different phases of the business cycle.3 
Wage Level Model 
The cross-sectional wage level equation used in this study is similar to Mincer [23], and has the following 
general form: 
(1) 
where i indexes the individual cross-sectional observations, and t indexes the time period. The dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage rate. The libS represent the personal characteristics which are 
assumed to be nonstochastic. The human capital variables include: education, potential labor force experience, 
experience squared, seniority, and seniority squared. The other standardizing variables are: local area 
unemployment rate, marital status, health status, southern residence, residence in a metropolitan area, and 
longitudinal union status.4 (30 is the intercept, and the (3" are the slope coefficients. As the subscripts indicate, the 
intercept and the slope coefficients are assumed to be constant over individuals and time. "It is the error term where 
"." = a, + E". a, is the time invariant component of the enor term which reflects unobservable individual-specific 
influences that help determine W,,; Ell is the component of the enor term that varies over individuals and time and 
is assumed to have a N(O.fiZ) distribution. ~ is the inverse of the Mills ratio from a probit equation that predicts 
the probability of sample inclusion. The inverse Mills ratio is added to the female regression to correct for sample 
selection bias.' 
The Mincer model estimates the union impact on wages by including seven longitudinal union change 
variables. The data are first separated into two main groups: (1) those who move between employers between 
times t and t+1. (i.e., movers); and (2) those who remain with their original employer over the time period, (i.e., 
stayers). For the mover group. there are four union change variables: (1) "01... , a unionjoiner; (2) "llM1' a union 
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leaver; (3) "11.., a union stayer; and (4) "00.., a nonunion stayer. For the stayers group, there are also four union 
change variables: (1) "OJ" a union joiner; (2) "UII' a union leaver; "11" a union stayer; and (4) "/Xlr' a nonunion 
stayer (the base group). Since this analysis focuses on the union effect of entry into and exit from union sector 
employers and the wage differential attributed to union job seniority, the study limits the empirical analysis to the 
"OJ.., "I"'" and "ll, variables. The analysis includes the "00.. group since the results are needed to calculate the true 
union effect. 
The interpretation of the coefficients on the union/nonunion change variables depends on whether equation 
a
(1) is estimated for period t or t +1. In period t when (1) is the ex ante wage equation, c\u.. estimates the nonunion 
wage differential between nonunion workers who will change employers to join the union sector in period t +1 and 
the nonunion base group, "/Xlr' In period t+1 when (1) becomes the ex post wage equation, Om.. estimates the union 
wage differential relative to the nonunion base group. In period t, al"" estimates the union wage differential between 
workers who will leave the union sector and their current employer in period t +1 and the nonunion base group. 
l "" in period t+1 estimates the wage gap between union leavers and the base group, after both groups are in the 
nonunion sector. In period t, aoo.. estimates the wage gap between the base group and workers who will change 
employers but remain nonunion. 000.. in period t +1 estimates the wage gap between nonunion workers' wages at 
their new employer and the base group. The difference between aoo.. in period t+ 1 and aoo.. in period t is the 
mobility premium fromjob search. In both periods, all, estimates the union differential between the nonunion base 
group and workers who remain in the union sector with their original employer. 
Since the union change variables measure union or nonunion status between two surveys, the variables will 
have the same value for the t and t+1 survey periods. The mean value for "11S in Table 1 indicates that males have 
a greater union coverage rate than females.6 The greater proportion of blacks in "OJ.. and "I"" indicates that they 
tend to be more mobile than whites in and out of the union sector. Females, however, have a greater presence in 
the nonunion sector as indicated by the higher proportion of females in ~ and the base group. 
Waae Change Model 
The wage change model uses the first-difference of the t+1 and t cross-sectional variables for each 
respective longitudinal period, and reveals the wage change due to a change in union status from period t to t +1. 
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The wage change model bas the following specification: 
(2) 
where it estimates the change in the natural logarithm. of the real hourly wage as a function of changes in the same 
variables included in the wage level equation. The change in experience is equal for all individuals in each time 
period and becomes the intercept for the wage change model.' Since the wage change model is equivalent to the 
first-difference of the cross-sectional wage level equation, it eliminates a. and the parameter estimates are free of 
heterogeneity bias. The dOl", coefficient estimates the wage change from entering the union sector after changing 
employers; d](M estimates the wage change from leaving the original employer and the union sector and is interpreted 
as a negative union effect; doo. estimates the wage change from changing nonunion employers and is interpreted as 
the mobility premium from job search; and du• estimates union negotiated wage changes. 
The wage change model yields identical results to the first-difference of the t+ 1 and t period wage level 
equations. Mincer uses this relationship to determine the "true" union joiner effect which he argues is the wage 
change estimate of the union joiner effect, dOl",' minus the mobility premium from job search, doo.r.. The true union 
joiner effect can be expressed by: 
(3) 
where the subscripts 1 and 2 indicate that the parameter estimates are from the a ante and a post cross-sectional 
wage level equations, respectively. The first bracketed term on the left-hand side is the a post new hire union wage 
difference between union joiners who changed employers and movers who stayed in the nonunion sector. The 
second bracketed term on the left-hand side is the selectivity bias term which is estimated from the a ante period 
nonunion wage difference between union joiners and nonunion stayers. This term is interpreted as a productivity 
differential (based on wages in the current job) between prospective union workers and nonunion workers who also 
search for new jobs. The left-hand side of the equation indicates that the true cross-sectional union differential is 
net of selectivity bias. 
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After rearranging terms, the first bracketed term on the right-hand side becomes the first-difference estimate 
of the union joiner effect. Since heterogeneity bias is additive to the cross-sectional wage level coefficients, ~'.,.)Z 
and (801.,.),' the heterogeneity bias term is eliminated in the first-difference and the union joiner effect is unbiased. 
The second bracketed term on the right-hand side is the mobility premium. 44\s. is the wage change model's 
estimate of the union joiner coefficient, do,., and 4a1»to is the estimate of the nonunion stayer coefficient, t4.. The 
term (4301• - 43mJ from the first-difference model corresponds to dOl.- dl»to from the wage change model. These 
terms can be used to estimate the true return to union joiners, net ofheterogeneity bias and the mobility premium.' 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The female and male wage change parameter estimates are given in Tables 2 and 3, respectively; and the 
female and male wage level estimates are given in Tables 4 and S, respectively.' In the wage change model. the 
coefficient values reflect the percentage wage change associated with the mobility pattern specified by a particular 
union status. Since the wage change model explains the percentage change in wage levels. the parameter estimates 
from the underlying Q ante and Q post wage level models reveal the source of the wage change phenomena. 
Wage change parameter estimates for female "01. workers (Table 2) suggest that both whites and blacks 
receive a positive. significant union joiner effect in the 1970-71 through 1973-77 time periods. In 1970-71, the 
Z198
_1white "01. coefficient is .2198 (Table 2). implying that wages for white females increase by e· or 24.6 percent 
after joining the union sector. The black "0,. coefficient of .2259 has a similar interpretation. In Figure 1, both 
the white and black fIo,. coefficients for the 1971-72, 1972-73, and 1973-77 periods have relatively similar 
magnitudes. By 1977-78. the female union effect begins to decline as the black effect is significantly smaller; and 
by 1980-82, neither female group receives a significant union joiner effect. The time trend in Figure 1 suggests 
that the female wage change from the union entry declines dramatically in the late 19708 and early 19808. 
The underlying cross-sectional wage level estimates for female unionjoiners imply the wage change from 
union entry. The "01. wage level results (Table 4) suggest that the positive wage changes for the 1970-71, 1971-72. 
and 1972-73 periods are caused by the difference between the negative Q ante coefficient and the positive Q post 
coefficient. For example. the 1971 white Q ante coefficient value of -.1339 implies that prospective union joiners 
have a wage level that is e,'JJ9_1 or 12.S percentage points lower than similar workers in the nonunion base group 
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(i.e., a negative wage gap). The 1972 a post coefficient of .1616 (fable 4) suggests that the union joiner's wage 
level is eo1616_1 or 17.5 percentage points larger than the base group's, after entry into the union sector (i.e, a 
positive union differential). The black 1971 a ante coefficient of -.2282 and the 1972 a post coefficient of .1962 
have similar interpretations. Thus, female union joiners experience a positive wage change as they proceed from 
a negative a ante wage gap to positive a post union differential. In Figure 3, the 1972-73 1101. wage level 
estimates for whites and blacks have values that are very similar to the 1971-72 period. The 1970-71 "01. wage 
level estimates have a similar pattern, but only the white a post union differential is significant. The positive a 
post union differentials are anticipated since union workers generally receive a positive wag gap relative to similar 
nonunion cohorts. The negative a ante differentials are not surprising since workers with low wages have the 
greatest incentive to change jobs. 
In the 1973-77 period, the union joiner wage change continues to be positive and at a magnitude similar 
to the 1970-71 through 1972-73 periods. As shown in Figure 3, the underlying pattern of the "01. wage level 
coefficients begin to change. By 1973-77, white females no longer have a significant, positive a post union 
differential (fable 4) and experience a positive union effect only by eliminating the negative a ante wage gap. By 
the 1977-78 period, neither the white nor black union joiners receive a positive a post union differential, and both 
female groups receive a positive union joiner effect only from the elimination of a negative 1977 a ante wage gap. 
In 1978-80, the wage change for white union joiners disappears as both the a ante and a post coefficients are 
insignificant; and by 1980-82, both white and black union joiner effects are also insignificant since neither group 
has a sufficiently large a ante or a post wage gap to cause a wage change. The results for the 1973-77 to 1980-82 
longitudinal periods suggest a significant weakening of unions' ability to impact female wages at entry level 
positions. This result is particularly surprising in the recessionary 1978-80 and 1980-82 periods because the union 
wage gap historically increases during periods of economic downturn. 
With respect to male "01. workers, the wage change parameter estimates (fable 3) suggest that both white 
and black males experience a significant and positive union joiner effect in almost all of the time periods; only the 
1980-81 estimate for blacks is insignificant. The white union joiner effect is larger than that for blacks in the 1970­
1971, 1971-1976, and 1980-81 periods, which correspond to relatively high or increasing employment. The black 
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union joiner effect is larger in the 1969·70 and 1976·78 periods, which correspond to low or declining 
unemployment. The 1978-80 period is inconsistent since a large black union effect occurs during a recession, but 
the unemployment rate was declining by the fourth quarter of 1980. The time trend in Figure 2 suggests that white 
union joiner effect is procyclical while the black union joiner effect is countercyclical. The female union effect in 
the 1970-71 through 1973·77 time periods is larger than the white male union effect; and the white male effect is 
larger, on average, than the black male union effect. The data do not allow for a good comparison since the NLS 
young men's survey does not cover the 1971·73 time period. The main distinction between the female and male 
union effect is that the female union effect declines significantly after the 1977-78 period while the magnitude of 
the male union effect is slightly larger, on average, than the previous periods. 
The underlying wage level estimates for male U01... workers (Table 5) suggest that the positive white union 
effect in the 1969·70, 1970-71, and 1971·76 periods is caused by going from a negative wage gap (relative to the 
nonunion stayer base group) for prospective union joiners to a positive ex post union differential. As illustrated in 
Figure 4, the trend in the white male union joiner wage level estimates is similar to the trend for females, but the 
white ex post union differential is consistently smaller. Black union joiners, in this period, have insignificant ex: 
ante coefficients which suggests that there is no difference between theirs and the base group's wage level when 
the prospective union joiners are in the nonunion sector. In the ex post periods, blacks receive a positive wage 
change via their large union differential. Because white union joiners go from a negative wage gap in the ex ante 
period to a positive union differential in the ex post period, they generally experience a larger percentage wage 
change than black union joiners (even though blacks receive consistently larger ex post union differentials). 
As do the females. white and black males experience a change in the pattern of their ex ante and ex post 
wage level estimates in the late 19708 and early 19808. The critical question is why do males continue to have a 
large positive wage change upon entry into the union sector in this period while females have a reduced or no 
positive wage effect'? Table 5 shows that after 1976 all white ex: post UOIIfI coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
White males continue to receive a large positive union joiner effect due to a numerically large negative ex ante 
nonunion differential. The magnitude of this term increases during recessions. In Figure 4, the time tend shows 
that this coefficient is responsible for the procyclical pattern of the white union joiner effect. Conversely, the black 
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male ex post union differential increases, especially during the recessionary years of 19SO and 1981, which Jives 
rise to the countercyclical pattern for the black male union joiner effect. The black ex ante "01,. coefficient (as 
opposed to the white nonunion differential) is statistically insignificant and remains at near zero values over the time 
trend. The exception is the 19SOestimate which has a significant, positive value and causes a decline in the 1980-81 
black union effect. Moreover, the time trend (Figure 4) in the ex ante wages of new union hires shows that over 
all time periods white males have lower nonunion wage profile than blacks, which is also the primary reason why 
whites receive a larger wage change from entry into the union sector. 
A similar case can be made for white and black females in the late 19708 and early 19808 since the loss 
of the negative ex ante wage gap is one of the reasons the female union joiner effect disappears in this period. The 
conflicting ex ante wage patterns associated with union entry has interesting implications. Union employers hire 
low wage nonunion white males (relative to their base group) while they simultaneously hire relatively high wage 
nonunion females and black males. This pattern is even more dominate during recessions since the white male ex 
ante wage gap moves procyclically. Either workers in the white nonunion base group have greater unobservable 
productivity characteristics (which cannot be controlled for in the cross-sectional wage equation) and therefore cause 
the negative ex ante wage gap, or union employers are discriminating among equally productive workers by hiring 
relative more productive, high wage nonunion females and black males while they are willing to hire relatively less 
productive, low wage nonunion whites. 
Union leavers, in theory, should suffer a wage loss when leaving the union sector; that is, experience a 
negative union effect. The female wage change results ("10. coefficients, Table 2) suggest that the wage loss is 
procyclical. The largest female wage losses (with the exception of blacks in 1978-80) occur in the 1973-77, 1978­
SO, and 1980-82 periods which correspond to transitions into or out of economic downturns. In the other time 
periods, there are no significant wage change estimates (with the exception of whites in 1970-71) which suggests 
that leaving the union sector in periods of low unemployment fails to have a negative impact on wages. The wage 
level results ("10. coefficient, Table 4) suggest that the negative wage loss from exiting the union sector during a 
recession is caused by a procyclical decline in the ex post nonunion wage rate. The reason union leavers do not 
incur a negative wage change during economic upturns is that the ex post nonunion wage is relatively higher in these 
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periods. 'Ibis trend is illustrated in Figure S. The 1971 white ex post coefficient is inconsistent with the overall 
trend, but it may reflect lack of experience since these workers are very young. The ex ante union differential 
apparently bas no significant impact on the wage loss since no ex ante uJo. coefficients in Table 4 are significant. 
'Ibis also suggests that part of the reason these workers leave the union sector is low relative wages. 
With respect to the male cohorts, the wage change results (u1o. coefficients in Table 3) suggest that the 
wage loss for both blacks and whites from leaving the union sector is also procyclical. Blacks appear to suffer the 
greatest wage loss, at least in the later years (Figure 2). The 1969-70 white male wage change is inconsistent with 
this argument, but it occurs when most of the cohorts are young, and the lack of experience may cause them to have 
low nonunion wages in a period of low unemployment. The wage level estimates for union leavers (u1o. coefficients 
in Table S) suggest that the black ex ante union differential has a countercyclical trend which apparendy causes the 
larger union leaver wage loss during recessions. Figure 6 shows that blacks receive relatively large ex post union 
differentials in the high unemployment years of 1976 and 1980; and in 1978, an expansionary year, the union wage 
gap is small and insignificant. The ex post nonunion differential appears to have a procyclical time trend; but none 
of the parameter estimates in Table S is significant. In the early 19708, white males have large union leaver wage 
losses resulting from going from a positive ex ante union differential to a large negative ex post nonunion 
differential. It is likely that the low nonunion wage structure is due to the inexperience ofwhite union leavers in 
this period. In the later 19708 when whites have a smaller procyclical union leaver wage loss, the wage change 
is caused by a large negative ex post nonunion wage gap that appears to increase (in absolute value) during 
recessions. The white ex ante union differential has little impact on wages (the pattern is similar for white females), 
and the 1978 estimate is negative and significant. Again. the inability of unions to capture a positive union 
differential likely causes these workers to exit the union sector. 
The wage level parameter estimates for union stayers capture the wage effect of union seniority ladders. 
The estimates for u11, workers (females. Table 4; and males. Table S) imply that both females and males receive 
a significant union wage premium in nearly all periods (only the white coefficient in the 1980 ex post period is 
insignificant).IO The u11, estimates imply that females and black males generally receive a larger union premium 
than white males. In the early 19708, the females' union premium is essentially equal to the white males', but this 
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is probably due to the relative lack of female seniority. By the mid-1970s, females have a significantly larger uoion 
differential. The most striking trend (Figures 7 and 8) is that the union differential for white males and white 
females declines from the mid-1970s. By the early 19808, the female union stayer differential is below IS 
percentage points and the white differential is between S percentage points and zero. The black female and black 
male union differential remains around 20 percentage points and retains the conventional countercyclical pattern. 
The white differentials no longer move in a countercyclical pattern. This attenuation of the white union stayer wage 
gap is consistent with the decline in the union differentials associated with the union joiner and leaver groups. 
Tables 6 and 7 represent a summary of the "true" return for female and male unionjoiners, respectively. 
The female true union effect (columns 3 and 4) bas a similar pattern to the unadjusted union joiner effect (Figures 
1 and 2), but is generally smaller due to the mobility adjustment. In the 1970-71 through 1973-77 periods, the 
female true union effect (both whites and blacks) is slightly larger, on average, than the white male true union effect 
for the 1969-70 through 1971-76 periods. The sizable female true union effect is cause by a union differential for 
new hires (column 1) that is larger, on average, than the males'; and by a large (in absolute value) negative female 
selectivity-in-hiring component (column 2). In the 1977-78 through 1980-82 periods, the female true union effect 
shrinks and is much smaller, on average, than the white and black males'. This attenuation is caused by a decline 
in the female new hire differential and a selectivity term that is now positive (with the exception of the white 1977­
78 term). The selectivity term which is based on wages in the nonunion sector can be interpreted as an estimate 
of relative productivity (at the current job). While the female selectivity term increases in magnitude over time, 
the white male selectivity component acquires a large negative value in the later periods (-.16S3 by the 1980-81 
period). Conversely, black union joiners exhibit the expected positive selectivity term (with the exception of 
1978-80). Negative selectivity implies that white male unionjoiners are relatively less productive than the nonunion 
stayers who search for a new job. Unioni..md females and black males, however, generally have stronger 
productivity characteristics than their nonunion counterparts. The negative selectivity result is surprising since most 
cross-sectional studies suggest that union workers, white and black, are more productive than comparable nonunion 
workers. II 
CONCLUSIONS 
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In general, the results show that unions' ability to impact wages for all white workers and black female 
union joiners has attenuated over the 1970s to the early 1980s. Union effects for all other black workers over this 
time period have remained relatively constant. From the early to mid-1970s, the female wage change from entering 
the union sector is typically larger than the wage change for males. Estimates for the "true" union joiner effect 
suggest that the female wage change is greater because of a large negative selectivity-in-hiring term (i.e., they are 
low wage nonunion workers). Therefore, they experience a larger wage change from entering the union sector. 
In the later 19708 and early 19808, the female wage change becomes significantly smaller (and in some instances 
it is actually negative), as the female selectivity term becomes a large positive value (i.e., they are now high wage 
nonunion workers). While the female union effect declines over time, the magnitude of the male union effect 
remains fairly stable over time. Union joiner effects are larger for white males primarily because white union 
joiners have lower productivity characteristics than black male union joiners, and therefore receive a larger wage 
change from entering the union sector. The larger white union effect generally does not result from a higher 
relative wage distribution in the union sector. The results suggest that either union employers are willing to hire 
less productive white males from the labor pool, or only low wage white males are willing to enter the union sector. 
The results also suggest that union employers may discriminate against females and blacks by hiring only the best 
qualified of these workers. 
The union stayer estimates (u11,) reflect the relative wage gains from seniority ladders. The results show 
that black females and black males receive the greatest relative benefits from remaining in the union sector. Both 
the white females' and the white males' union stayer wage differential declines over the mid-1970s to early 19808. 
The decline in the white male wage gap is so great that difference between union and nonunion wage rate is less 
than 5 percentage points in the 19808. 
NOTES 
1. To make a more direct comparison between similar union and nonunion workers, all agriculture and 
self-employed cohorts are eliminated from the sample. 
2. The exact length of time over each longitudinal period vary due to variations in the number of years 
between surveys which report union status. The longitudinal periods vary from one to five years. It is unlikely 
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that the difference longitudinal lengths will bias the results since the cohorts are of the same age group, and the 
variation in wages are not subject to demographic tends. 
3. Ashenfelter [2] demonstrates that the union differential declines in periods of low unemployment and/or 
accelerating inflation (and vice versa) as nonunion wages react to prevailing market conditions. The longitudinal 
periods in this study that coincide with a recession 1973-77, 1978-80, and 1980-82 periods in the female survey; 
and the 1971-76, 1976-78, and 1980-81 periods in the male survey. 
4. The marital categorical variable equals one if married, and the health categorical variable equals one 
if the interviewee reports that his or her health hinders job performance. 
5. This technique for selectivity bias correction was developed by Heckman [15]. The ~ term is estimated 
from a probit model that predicts inclusion in the sample (i.e., the wage equation). The probit model includes all 
the explanatory variables in the wage equation with the exception of the union variables, senority, and senority 
squared which are determined by one's employment decision. Also included are variables that help determine 
female labor force participation: school enrollment status, number of children, and other household income. The 
correction for selectivity bias is not used in the male wage equation since most males in the sample are in the labor 
force, and therefore sample selectivity is not a serious issue. 
6. Female sample mean values are reported for only the 1970-1971 time period, and male sample mean 
values are reported for only the 1969-1971 time period to avoid a cumbersome array of tables. The longitudinal 
sample reflects the number of observations after attrition due to missing variables in either cross-sectional survey. 
The 1971-72 female sample has 1120 white observations and 376 black observations; the 1972-73 sample has 1179 
white observations and 424 black observations; the 1973-77 sample has 1210 white observations and 493 black 
observations; the 1977-78 sample contains 1289 white observations and 542 black observations; the 1978-80 sample 
has 1085 white observations and 459 black observation; and the 1981-82 sample has 1239 white observations and 
557 black observations. The 1971-76 male sample has 1526 white observations and 425 black observations; the 
1976-78 sample contains 1731 white observations and 478 black observations; the 1978-80 sample has 1738 white 
observations and 481 black observation; and the 1980-81 sample has 1760 white observations and 522 black 
observations. 
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7. The change in a individual's labor force experience over the longitudinal period will be identical for 
all interviewees. Additionally, the change in education is included in the wage change model. Typically, this 
variable is assumed to be time invariant. However, there are differences in the highest grade attained across all 
sampling periods and the variable proves to be significant for females and black males. 
8. In practice, the first-difference and wage change estimates will differ due to different error structures. 
9. The parameter estimates for the probit model and the explanatory variables in the a ante and a post 
wage level and wage change equations are available in an unpublished appendix. 
10. Since the u11• parameter estimates are from the cross-sectional wage model, they will contain a positive 
heterogeneity bias. 
11. This result is inconsistent with the well established findings of a positive selectivity bias term estimated 
using a probit model (in particular, see Lee [18]; and Duncan and Leigh [9]). 
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Table 1 

Union Variable Definitions and Mean Values (Standard Deviation) 

Union Variables Definition White Females White Males Black Females Black Males 
1 if union joiner who moves .031 (.030) .038 (.191) .041 (.039) .057 (.232) 
"01... 
1 if union leaver who moves .031 (.030) .045 (.207) .050 (.047) .075 (.265) 
"1IJ ... 
1 if union stayer who moves .032 (.031) .086 (.282) .058 (.055) .129 (.335) 
"11... 
1 if nonunion stayer who moves .378 (.235) .332 (.471) .368 (.233) .293 (.456) 
"1»01 
1 if union joiner who stays .030 (.030) .021 (.143) .041 (.039) .026 (.161) 
"01. 
"10- 1 if union leaver who stays .023 (.023) .009 (.096) .032 (.031) .034 (.181) 
1 if union stayer who stays .102 (.092) .168 (.374) .122 (.108) .161 (.368) "11. 
1 if nonunion stayer who stays (base) .373 (.293) .301 (.296) .467 (.499) .225 (.274) 
"00. 
Sample Size: t 1117 1737 341 529 
tTbe female and male sample size is based on the 1970-71 period. 
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Table 2 
Parameter Estimates (and Standard Errors) 
for the Female Wage Change Regressions 
Union Variables 	 White Sample 
1970-71 Period: 
110. 	 .2198 (.0584)t 
-.1074 (.0572)1 
"lOR 
"-	
.0211 (.0301) 
.0210 (.0329) "11. 
1971-72 Period: 
110. 	 .2439 (.06OO)t 
-.0431 (.0639) 
"lOR 
.0728 (.0263)t
"­
.0104 (.0286) "11. 
1972-73 Period: 
110. 	 .3733 (.0590)t 
.0671 (.0622) 
"lOR 
.0269 (.0261) 
"­
-.0083 (.0266) "11. 
1973-77 Period: 
.1656 (.0514)t 1101... 
-.2072 (.0535)t
"lOR 
.0125 (.0312) 
"­
-.0037 (.0433) "11. 
1977-78 Period: 
.2246 (.0458)t 1101... 
-.0447 (.0523) 
"lOR 
.0232 (.0231) 
"­
1411• 	 -.0189 (.0239) 
1978-80 Period: 
.0139 (.0455) IIru.. 
-.2153 (.0598)t 
"lOR 
.0284 (.0263)" 
"­
-.0104 (.0288) "n. 
1980-82 Period: 
.0260 (.0624) 1101... 
-.1477 (.0450)t 
"lOR 
-.03SS (.0237)· 
"­
.0346 (.0292) 
"11. 
°A .20 probability value of a nonzero estimaw-two tail teat. 
fp S .01 
*p S .OS 
Ip S .10 
BlackSamp1e 
.2259 (.0809)t 
.0625 (.0748) 
.1258 (.0443)t 
.0248 (.0483) 
.3374 (.0811)t 
.0020 (.0862) 
.0249 (.0488)" 
.0396 (.0400) 
.3609 (.0564)t 
-.0132 (.0817) 
.0989 (.0384)t 
-.0073 (.0342) 
.2611 (.0725)t 
-.1652 (.0705)t 
.0356 (.0456) 
.0735 (.0589) 
.0838 (.0680)" 
-.0042 (.0849) 
.0970 (.0393)t 
-.0035 (.0384) 
.1680 (.0606)t 
.0404 (.1134) 
.0838 (.0493)1 
.0111 (.0399) 
-.0342 (.0694) 
-.1414 (.0553)t 
-.0045 (.0354) 
-.0021 (.0341) 
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Table 3 

Parameter Estimates (and Standard Errors) 

for the Male Wage Change Regressions 

Union Variables White Sample Black Sample 
1969-70 Period: 
.1395 (.0336)t .1524 (.0443)t 
-.3059 (.0344)t -.0932 (.0549)1 
.0047 (.0213) -.0413 (.0360)" 
-.0006 (.0204) .0386 (.0348) 
1970-71 Period: 
"oJ... .2196 (.0383)t .1049 (.0558)1 
"HM -.1499 (.0361)f -.0487 (.0504) 
11m.. .0346 (.0186)1 .0479 (.0339)" 
.0173 (.0208)" .0539 (.0380) 
1971-76 Period: 
"o/rro
"HM 
.2435 (.0411)f 
-.1718 (.0471)t 
.1166 (.0678)1 
-.1995 (.0734)t 
11m.. .0498 (.2099)1 .0732 (.0522)" 
-.0417 (.0310)" -.0042 (.0534) 
1976-78 Period: 
.2111 (.0423)t .2527 (.0628)t 
-.0188 (.0484) -.0675 (.0960) 
.0654 (.0239)f .1727 (.0529)t 
-.0260 (.0190)" -.0647 (.0372)1 
1978-80 Period: 
.1542 (.0491)t .2515 (.l002)t 
-.0415 (.0479) -.1532 (.0886)1 
.0185 (.0247) .0149 (.0510) 
-.0357 (.0191)1 -.0112 (.0405) 
1980-81 Period: 
"oJ... .2911 (.0671)t .1264 (.1172) 
"HM -.1953 (.0506)t -.3281 (.0985)t 
11m.. -.0134 (.0205) -.0432 (.0499) 
-.0106 (.0170) .0396 (.0374) 
·A .20 probability value of a nonzero estimate--two tail test. 
tp :s; .01 
*p :s; .OS 
Ip :s; .10 
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Table 4 

Parameter Estimates (and Standard Errors) 

for the Female Cross-Sectional Wage Level Regressions 

(ex tmlel Period 
Union Variables White Sample 
1970-71 Period: 
-.0419 (.0575) IIolrR 
ulOft 	 -.0049 (.0570) 

-.1295 (.0244)' 

"­
.1380 (.0340)' 14110 
1971-72 Period: 
-.1339 (.0639)* IIolrR 

ulOft -.0211 (.0682) 

-.1012 (.0258)' 

"­
.1920 (.0316)t 14110 
1972-73 Period: 
-.2229 (.0626)t IIolrR 

UlOft -.0584 (.0657) 

14m.. -.0577 (.0234)' 

.2173 (.0299)' 14110 
1973-77 Period: 
-.1634 (.0465)t 1101". 

ulOft .0702 (.0456f 

-.1145 (.0253)t 

"­
.1387 (.0411)t 14110 
1977-78 Period: 
-.1735 (.0542)' 1101". 

UlOft -.0280 (.0591) 

-.0897 (.0251}t 

"­
.1415 (.0292)' 14110 
1978-80 Period: 
-.0524 (.0487) IIoJ". 
.0150 (.0627) 
"lOft 
-.1118 (.0275}t 
"­
.1054 (.0326)' 14110 
1980-82 Period: 
.0443 (.0687) IloJ.. 
UlOft 	 -.0195 (.0502) 

-.1078 (.0260)'

"­
.0672 (.0330)* 
"11, 
·A .20 probability value of a nonzero cstimatc-two tail test. 
tp S .01 
*p S .OS 
'P S .10 
Black Sample 
-.0884 (.0855) 
-.0006 (.0801) 
-.1200 (.0435)' 
.0947 (.0458)1 
-.2282 (.0862)' 
-.1066 (.0929) 
-.0382 (.0440) 
.1250 (.0445)t 
-.1707 (.0633)t 
.0824 (.0877) 
-.1279 (.0389)' 
.1659 (.0411)' 
-.1509 (.0578)' 
.0535 (.0552) 
-.1024 (.0354)t 
.1570 (.0497)' 
-.1437 (.0672)* 
.0827 (.0848) 
-.1573 (.0381}t 
.1916 (.0413)t 
.0345 (.0630) 
-.1043 (.1168) 
-.0464 (.0469) 
.2319 (.0432)' 
-.0192 (.0796) 
.0783 (.0634) 
-.0297 (.0391) 
.1515 (.0409)' 
(ex ll!lsll Period 
White Sample 
.1842 (.0661)t 
-.1131 (.0666)* 
-.0849 (.0405)* 
.1575 (.0353)t 
.1616 (.0662)' 
-.0104 (.0710) 
.0068 (.0340) 
.2034 (.0310)' 
.1722 (.0682)t 
.0448 (.0711) 
.0083 (.0326) 
.2018 (.0309)t 
.0209 (.0514) 
-.1248 (.0520)' 
-.0834 (.0328)t 
.1384 (.0430)t 
.0397 (.0538) 
-.0354 (.0602) 
-.0385 (.0299)" 
.1315 (.0283)' 
-.0371 (.0579) 
-.1585 (.0713)* 
-.0771 (.0381)* 
.0985 (.0353)t 
.1041 (.0754r 
-.1622 (.0554)t 
-.1286 (.0318)t 
.0900 (.0353)t 
Black Sample 
.0990(.0973) 
.0968 (.0927) 
-.0088 (J)635) 
.1493 (.059O)t 
.1962 (.0899)* 
.0223(.0999) 
.0699 (.0526)" 
.1689 (.0444)t 
.2870 (.0695)t 
.1463 (.0919r 
.0565 (.0501) 
.1602 (.0402)' 
.1283 (.0724)' 
-.0592 (.0701) 
-.0363 (.0485) 
.2273 (.0568)t 
-.1109 (.0691), 
.0176(.0862) 
-.1042 (.0418)t 
.1833 (.<Wen)' 
.1639 (.0686)' 
-.1026 (.1169) 
.0079 (.0594) 
.2099 (.0413)t 
-.0525 (.0672) 
-.0356 (.0672) 
-.0146 (.0445) 
.1325 (.0414)t 
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Table 5 

Parameter Estimates (and Standard Brrors) 

for the Male Cross-Sectional Wage Level Regressions 

(ex antel Period 
Union Variables White Sample 
1969-70 Period: 
IIoJ", -.0886 (.0347)' 
.1153 (.0352)'
".1000 
-.1428 (.0209)' 
"tn.. 
"llo .1246 (.0218)' 
1970-71 Period: 
-.1607 (.0464)t 140m 
.0145 (.0427) 
".1000 
-.1118 (.0243)' 
"aM. 

"llo .1111 (.0253)' 

1971-76 Period: 
-.1308 (.0370)' 140m 
.0852 (.0410)* 
".1000 
-.0744 (.0243)'
"aM. 

"110 .1264 (.0290)' 

1976-78 Period: 
-.2156 (.0455)t 
-.0359 (.0519) 
140_ 
"/000 
-.1167 (.0241)t 
"aM. 

"llo .0684 (.0218)t 

1978-80 Period: 
-.1227 (.0598)* 140m 
-.1230 (.0555)* 
".1000 
-.0666 (.0281)* 
"<0.. 
.0639 (.0242)t 
"11, 
1980-81 Period: 
-.2428 (.0897)t 
"Om 
.0536 (.0648) 
"/000 
-.0775 (.0313)t 
"aM. 

"110 .0348 (.0236)" 

Black Sample 
-.0266 (.0437) 
.1612 (.0577)' 
-.0361 (.0354) 
.1888 (.0393)' 
-.0411 (.0615) 
.0937 (.0557)1 
-.0731 (.0397)1 
.1811 (.0443)' 
-.0168 (.0572) 
.0888 (.0596)· 
-.0875 (.0419)* 
.1553 (.0484)' 
-.0274 (.0613) 
.1903 (.0962)* 
-.0390 (.0515) 
.2295 (.0402)t 
-.0354 (.1010) 
.0577 (.0902) 
-.0208 (.0506) 
.1703 (.0427)t 
.1770 (.1309)" 
.2234 (.1012)* 
-.0687 (.0553) 
.2264 (.0435)t 
(ex l'!Sl.stl Period 
White Sample Black Sample 
.0604 (.0409)" 
-.1732 (.0416)' 
-.1210 (.0277)' 
.1158 (.0235)' 
.1428 (.OS51)' 
.0681 (.0620) 
-.0745 (.0423), 
.2182 (.0399)t 
.0436 (.0500) 
-.1483 (.0468)t 
-.0848 (.0287)' 
.1347 (.02S1)t 
.0844 (.0706) 
.0395 (.0629) 
-.0186 (.0451) 
.2133 (.0462)' 
.1059 (.0408)' 
-.0548 (.0454) 
.0007 (.0313) 
.0738 (.029O)t 
.1468 (.0725'f 
-.0365 (.0766) 
-.0023 (.0571) 
.1543 (.OS58)' 
-.0338 (.0580) 
-.0799 (.0653) 
-.0805 (.0386)* 
.0398 (.0249)" 
.1556 (.0778'1 
.1161 (.1087) 
.0635 (.0691) 
.1545 (.043O)t 
.0388 (.0629) 
-.1662 (.0585)t 
-.0394 (.0346) 
.0277 (.0238) 
.2870 (.1165)' 
-.0690 (.1035) 
.0677 (.0655) 
.1581 (.0454)t 
.0561 (.0940) 
-.1333 (.0704)1 
-.1067 (.0372)t 
.0477 (.0243)* 
.2851 (.1266'/ 
-.0409 (.1008) 
-.1112 (.OS78'1 
:211J9 (.0413)t 
·A .20 probability value of a nonzero estimate-two tail test. 
P :s; .01 
" :s; .05 
'p :s; .10 
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Table 6 

Summary of the Net Union loiner Wage Effect for the 

Female Wage Level and Wage Change Models 

True Union Wage True Wage 
Union Wage Selectivity Differential Change of Union Stayer 
Differentials in Net of Union loiners Union Wage 
New Hires Hiring Selectivity Net of Mobility Differential 
(001 - 000)2 (001 - 000)\ (1)-(2) (dOl - daJ) ex post 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
197~71 Period: 
White: .2691 .0876 .1815 .1987 .1575 
Black: .1078 .0316 .0762 .1001 .1493 
1971-72 Period: 
White: .1548 -.0327 .1875 .1711 .2034 
Black: .1263 -.1900 .3163 .3125 .1689 
1972-73 Period: 
White: .1639 -.1652 .3291 .3464 .2018 
Black: .2305 -.0428 .2733 .2620 .1603 
1973-77 Period: 
White: .1043 -.0489 .1532 .1531 .1383 
Black: .1646 -.0485 .2131 .2255 .2273 
1977-78 Period: 
White: .0782 -.0838 .1620 .2014 .1315 
Black: .0067 .0136 -.0069 -.0132 .1833 
1978-80 Period: 
White: .0400 .0594 -.0194 -.0145 .0984 
Black: .1560 .0809 .0751 .0842 .2099 
198~82 Period: 
White: .2327 .1521 .0806 .0645 .0900 
Black: -.0379 .0105 -.0484 -.0297 .1325 
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Table 7 

Summary of the Net Union Joiner Wage Effect for the 

Wage Level and Wage Change Models 

True 
Union Wage True Wage 
Union Wage Selectivity Differential Change of Union Stayer 
Differentials in Net of Union Joiners Union Wage 
New Hires Hiring Selectivity Net of Mobility Differential 
(8m ­ 800>2 (801 - 800>1 (1)-(2) (dOl - doo) ex post 
(I) l2l (3) (4) (5) 
1969-70 Period: 
White: .1814 .0542 .1272 .1348 .1258 
Black: .1963 .0050 .1913 .1937 .2182 
1970-71 Period: 
White: .1284 -.0489 .1773 .1850 .1640 
Black: .1030 .0321 .0709 .0570 .2389 
1971-76 Period: 
White: .1052 -.0564 .1616 .1937 .0738 
Black: .1491 .0707 .0784 .0434 .1543 
1976-78 Period: 
White: .0467 -.0991 .1458 .1457 .0398 
Black: .0921 .0116 .0805 .0800 .1545 
1978-80 Period: 
White: .0782 
-.0561 .1343 .1357 .0277 
Black: .2193 -.0149 .2342 .2365 .1581 
1980-81 Period: 
White: .1629 -.1653 .3281 .3045 .0477 
Black: .3963 .2457 .1506 .1696 .2699 
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